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Abstract 
Companies recognize international sourcing as a business practice useful to reduce 
product prices, deal with supply shortages and identify new competitive suppliers. 
Effective international sourcing implies the integration and coordination of 
materials, processes, information flows and multiple producers at each buying 
location. Many companies do not have the capabilities or the willingness to develop 
and manage such sourcing networks; therefore, other entities have assumed these 
responsibilities. These coordinators are in charge of the integration of many 
suppliers to develop full-package production, serve as liaisons between suppliers’ 
capabilities and market demands, and provide the technical and financial support to 
sustain the sourcing network. The review of the industrial clustering and global 
supply chain literature allowed the identification of such coordinators in Mexico. 
The emergence and profile of these coordinators is associated with corporate 
strategies of multinational firms, the efforts of industrial groups, and the 
governmental policies for the development of dynamic industrial regions. This paper 
analyzes the characteristics of four coordination models identified in the Mexican 
context, focusing on their contribution to the participation and upgrading of national 
suppliers. The profile of the coordinator firm, the type of relations that this firm 
sustains with producers and the support offered to suppliers is also discussed. A 
particular emphasis is given to the fourth model where a third party, a knowledge 
and service company, assumes the coordinator role. The interest on this model is 
due to its novelty, the flexibility of the sourcing network, and the potential impact 
on regional development that could result from the intervention of a neutral third 
party as coordinator of the activities of multiple local and specialized suppliers.  
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Section 1:  Introduction  
Supply chain management (SCM) continues to be a topic of considerable interest 
for academics and practitioners. Research in SCM has evolved from its core conception 
around logistics and operational activities to become a multi-faceted concept that is now 
studied from different theoretical perspectives such as strategic management, 
relationship marketing, knowledge management, institutional economics, systems 
theory, etc. (Giannakis and Croom, 2004).  Multiple definitions for SCM have been 
provided, Mentzer et al. (2001, p. 18) integrate them and distinguish SCM from related 
concepts, to define SCM as “… the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional 
business functions within a particular company and across businesses within the supply 
chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual 
companies and the supply chain as a whole.” 
 
In the earliest versions of the supply chain concept, firms sought to achieve vertical 
integration by establishing direct coordination over all the activities of the chain to 
obtain the desired efficiency and responsiveness (LaLonde and Masters, 1994, p. 39). 
But as supply chains become more complex as a result of the dynamics of the business 
environment, new manufacturing and management philosophies, downsizing and the 
increased trend in outsourcing; integration via full ownership and restricted to the firm’s 
boundaries is no longer the best alternative. Competition is not longer among individual 
businesses but between supply chains, therefore vertically integrated companies need to 
reorient their strategies to accomplish integration across the following dimensions (Lee, 
2000):  
a) Information integration, described as the sharing of information and knowledge 
among the members of the supply chain 
b) Coordination, which refers to the redeployment of decision rights and resources 
to synchronize complementary and dissimilar activities through effective 
relationships with multiple tiers of suppliers, customers and third parties, and 
c) Organizational linkages that includes communication, the implementation of 
supply chain performance metrics and the alignment of objectives among 
integrants of the chain. 
 
The integration of the supply chain is affected by factors such as the degree of 
competition and maturity of the industry, the nature of the products (commodities or 
technology-intensive products), the dominance versus balanced power in the chain, and 
the strategic orientation of the leader firms (Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2002; 
Stonebraker and Liao, 2004). The position and orientation of the leading firms in the 
supply chain is critical for the development of cooperative relationships and the 
integration of participants, but it is not clear if current leading firms, including 
transnational companies (TNCs), are the most suitable entities to support such 
integration, especially for small and medium suppliers in the lowest tiers of the chain, 
given the “hit-run” strategy of reallocating production in emerging low cost labor 
regions with the consequent de-industrialization (industrial and technology 
infrastructure loss) and job loss. To address this issue, this work analyzes the 
characteristics of sourcing networks related to global supply chains (SC) in Mexico, 
focusing on the contribution of current organizational models in the specific subject of 
development and upgrading of suppliers, and their potential contribution to industrial 
development as result of partnerships with local suppliers.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we present the critical concepts on 
coordination of the global supply chain. This section depicts the mini-maestro model as 
an alternative to vertical reintegration of the supply chain. The second section outlines 
the methodology followed to identify and profile the four coordination models related to 
global supply chains in the Mexican context. The third section describes the 
characteristics of each model, the role of the lead firms coordinating the sourcing 
network to serve the orders of international buyers, and their potential impact on the 
development of local suppliers. Particular examples for each model are used to support 
the discussion; the section ends with a comparative analysis of the models. In the 
following section a detailed analysis on the fourth coordination model derived from the 
study of two cases is presented, this model corresponds to a sourcing network 
coordinated by a third party. The interest on this model is because of its novelty, the 
profile of the coordinator firm and its role as orchestrator of existing domestic suppliers 
without a direct participation in production. The final section of the paper gives general 
conclusions and implications of the models for research, the elaboration of 
governmental policies intended to support the development of competitive sourcing 
networks in Mexico and the emergence of service and knowledge based companies able 
to coordinate segments of the fragmented supply chain.  
 
 
Global sourcing and the emergence of coordinators  
 
Globalization has made it possible to source from any region in the world with 
lower production costs, therefore many firms pursue global sourcing with the objective 
to improve their profitability margins and increase their base of competitive suppliers. 
The concept of global sourcing differs from international purchasing, this last term 
refers to the commercial transaction between a buyer and a producer located in different 
countries meanwhile global sourcing is defined as the integration and pro-active 
coordination of materials, components, process, technologies, designs and facilities 
across the world (Trent and Monczka, 2005). The global sourcing concept has several 
implications, among the most relevant we identified the following: 
1) The disintegration of the supply chain, which has become a complex network of 
entities geographically dispersed (the global supply chain) that require coordinating and 
linking major business processes, and the management of information and cash flows 
within and across companies 
2) The development of full package production (complete production of a particular 
product line) by linking multiple specialized producers able to manufacture all 
components and to assembly final products, to create regional sourcing networks 
attractive to international buyers 
3) The need to improve logistics infrastructure and services in the sourcing regions in 
order to efficiently move products from manufacturing to consumption points. Logistics 
is critical to assure competitive prices and profitability because low labor costs could 
not overcome the costs of moving goods produced at remote regions.  
4) The need for responsible agents that align integrants’ objectives, coordinate activities 
and transfer knowledge and expertise to improve local supplier’s capabilities, especially 
those small producers (SMEs) that operate at the lowest tiers of the sourcing networks.  
 
The disintegration of the supply chain as a result of global sourcing is considered a 
temporal state, but the required reintegration does not imply the re-establishment of 
vertical integration. The new supply chain network is being formed by parallel 
relationships between different layers, this structure calls for increased coordination, 
subdivision and redistribution of responsibilities for producing and moving materials, 
and the rapid integration of new partners (Bitran et al., 2007). Therefore, novel forms of 
coordination are required, opening the opportunity for the appearance of new entities 
capable to orchestrate the activities of a large number of suppliers and third parties and 
sustain partnerships with critical customers. In the case of the automotive sector, 
multinational automakers have opted for an internal governance structure that assures 
the fulfillment of corporative rules and procedures. In consequence, automakers have 
transferred to their one (or “zero”) tier suppliers -the large original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) like Bosch, Magna International, Johnson Controls or Dana 
Corporation- the responsibility of the main decisions about product and information 
flows, as well as the administration of lower tier suppliers. In the chain’s segment or 
layer where these OEMs figure as the leader firm, they are in charge of the development 
of sub-systems and modules in collaboration with the automaker, and assume the 
responsibility for the management of multiple suppliers, perform or outsource the 
associated logistics activities, and set the objectives for the integrants. Whitford and 
Zeitlin (2004) found dysfunctional the OEMs’ supplier management model due to the 
traditional transactional and price-based relations these companies sustain with their 
suppliers and the limited manufacturing capabilities of the producers’ base. These 
factors are considered barriers for effective coordination, the establishment of 
partnerships and the development of suppliers, the mediation of external organizations 
is claimed relevant to overcome these barriers.  
 
The increasing customer demands for quality, flexibility, cost and design, have created 
the opportunity for the emergence of collaborative partnerships between leading firms 
in the supply chain and producers located in developing regions (Zeitlin, 2004). These 
partnerships imply SC leading firms’ involvement in the training and upgrading of 
suppliers’ capabilities, promoting suppliers’ participation in more value-added activities 
instead of just absorbing production, increasing the suppliers’ opportunity to access the 
international market and advancing long-term continuous relationships. But leading 
firms in the global supply chain tends to develop embedded ties only with first-tier 
suppliers and relegate small firms to mere suppliers of parts and components of low 
value. This makes SMEs highly dependent on the orders of the primary manufacturers 
they supply, forcing them to attend the norms and requirements of large buyers which 
select and evaluate smaller suppliers in terms of efficiency and price, and easily replace 
them in case of failure (Qualyle, 2003). Many of these SMEs are located in developing 
regions where they significantly contribute to employment and industrialization; 
therefore, governments and other organizations have tried to implement programs 
designed to develop both their productive and export capabilities via the formation of 
regional industrial clusters. 
 
Research in developing regions (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Doner and Hershberg, 
1999, and Gereffi, 2001), including Mexico, indicates that local manufacturing 
processes and products upgrading can occur incrementally when learning occurs in 
global supply chains and regional industrial clusterings, while the introduction of 
governmental policies and private initiatives advancing a supply chain’s governance 
structure that advance industrialization (Zeitlin, 2004) is taking place. Hence, the 
integration of domestic firms in a global supply chain could contribute to regional 
development through the dissemination of knowledge and experience provided the 
leading firms have the interest to develop cooperative relations with local suppliers. 
These leading firms can support supplier’s development programs and also play a 
coordinator role. The firms able to play this role are not necessarily the large 
manufacturers or brand owners in the global SC, but firms that control the access to 
major resources, in the form of tangible assets (technologies), capacities (product 
design) or information (consumer demand) (Gereffi, 2001). 
 
In the context of logistics outsourcing, van Hoek (2001) analyzes the model of UPS 
Worldwide Logistics as a logistics leader or fourth logistics provider (4PL) that assumes 
full responsibility of all OEMs’ logistics problems by effectively managing all product 
and information flows. The 4PL is the only point of contact between the customer and 
multiple 3PLs which are coordinated by the 4PL with the aim of taking advantage of 
3PL’s expertise to optimize the logistics of the supply chain. As the 4PL advances in its 
coordinator role, it also receives and manages customer’s orders and enlarges its 
understanding of the customer’s replenishment process. By integrating information 
about customer orders and supply operations, the 4PL could get complete visibility of 
operations and products flows to be in a position of coordinating not only logistics but 
also manufacturing operations while the customer is fully dedicated to design and 
marketing. Bitran et al. (2007, p. 34) go further in the discussion of the potential 
contribution of a neutral third party to the reintegration of the supply chain by 
introducing the concept of “maestro”, an external entity, possibly external to the chain 
that coordinates the entire network, functions as the unique linkage among the focal 
firm in the SC, the suppliers, customers and 3PLs, and aligns the incentives for all these 
players. However the authors argue that leader firms are not likely to give full control of 
the supplier’s base to the “maestro”, but many will be willing to consider the value-
added services of a modified version of this entity, the “mini-maestro”. A mini-maestro 
controls only a segment of the complete supply chain by integrating multiple 
specialized suppliers within a region to develop full-package production and efficient 
logistics; meanwhile the focal company retains control over the rest of the supplier base 
and maintains close partnerships with strategic suppliers. The “mini-maestro” provides 
value added services to customers, supports and/or manages the production of multiple 
suppliers, coordinates their activities, assumes the responsibility for the logistics and the 
management of collaborative relations in the network, and aligns the participants’ 
objectives with those of the complete chain. Figure 1 describes graphically this mini-
maestro model. 
 
 Figure 1. The Mini-maestro Model (Adapted from Bitran et al., p. 34) 
 
Bitran et al. (2007) provide two examples of such emerging system integrators or “mini-
maestros”: Flextronics International Ltd. in the electronics sector and Li & Fung Group 
in the textile and apparel sector. Flextronics is a leader company that provides 
manufacturing services, its portfolio of services includes the complete design of 
electronics products and their total manufacturing. Flextronics controls a vertical 
sourcing network integrated by suppliers that operate in six industrial parks located in 
low-cost labor regions; each park is a manufacturing center which affords full-
production. Flextronics not only controls all manufacturing activities, but also 
administrates all the SC logistics either by performing the activities or creating strategic 
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alliances with lead logistics providers. Li & Fung, originally a trader company, also 
plays the mini-maestro role but with a different business model. Contrary to Flextronics, 
Li & Fung is mainly a service company that coordinates all the productive activities in 
the textile and apparel chain by capitalizing on its knowledge about the manufacturing 
capabilities of Asian suppliers and the relationships developed when working as a 
trader. The group strategy is based on its coordination capabilities: its ability to expand 
and manage multi-region sourcing networks and its logistics competences, which are 
additionally capitalized through IDS group, a specific branch specialized in logistics 
and marketing. Li & Fung portfolio of services include product design, sourcing of raw 
materials, control of production, consolidation of orders, exportation of goods, 
marketing support and the execution of all logistics activities required to deliver 
multiple orders to international customers (brand owners, retailers and marketers) or to 
distribute products in eleven Asian countries. Li & Fung receives customer orders, and 
decomposes them to assign production to many manufacturers located mainly in China 
and other six countries in Asia, and to others in Oriental Europe and America 
(Meredith, 2006). Even though both companies, Flextronics and Li & Fung, play the 
mini-maestro role and serve as intermediaries between regional suppliers and buyers, 
Bitran et al. (2007) question the flexibility of the vertical model of Flextronics and 
consider more configurable the Li & Fung supply network which is sustained by social 
ties that promote trust, the compromise and the collaboration of the participants with the 
coordinator. Then, different forms of coordination, managed by entities with distinctive 
characteristics are emerging and could be implemented to reintegrate the supply chain.  
 
The objective of this work is to analyze the characteristics of current organizational 
models or forms of coordination of sourcing networks identified in the Mexican context, 
making particular emphasis on the analysis of a model where a neutral third party 
functions as “mini-maestro”. The interest in Mexico is due to the country’s vocation 
toward international sourcing and its geographical proximity to USA (and Canada) 
market that facilitates product transportation and reduces delivery times. The 
attractiveness of Mexico as a global sourcing region increased notably after the peso 
devaluations (1993 and 1994) and NAFTA, especially among some sectors as apparel, 
automotive and electronics (Gereffi et al., 2002). The two following factors contributed 
to Mexico’s orientation to global sourcing:  
a) Governmental policies like the maquiladora program (assembly or 
manufacturing firms wholly or partially owned by foreign companies that do not 
pay taxes on imports but only on the value added to the product in Mexico), the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (preferential access to USA markets for Latin 
American countries) and the promotion of regional industrial poles as a means 
for economic development. 
b) Upgrading of Mexico’s productive base and acceptable logistics infrastructure 
via regional industrialization and the development of telecommunications, 
specialized customs services, transportation corridors (NAFTA highway, among 
others), privatization of railways (Ferromex, TFM, Ferrosur) and foreign 
investment in inter-modal transportation.  
 
Two of the four models to be presented and discussed in the following section are 
closely related to governmental initiatives (the “maquiladora” model and regional  
industrial clusters) and have been extensively studied but from different perspectives 
(Schmitz, 1995; Chaston and Mangles, 2000; Enright and Roberts, 2001; Gereffi et al. 
2001; and Arbonies and Moso, 2002). The other two models, and in particular the 
fourth, are structured from new data around the following aspects: a) the profile of the 
coordinator firm, b) the identification of the activities within the supply chain 
supervised or performed by the coordinator, c) the pitfalls in the execution of such 
activities, d) the support offered to suppliers in particular domestic and/or small 
producers, and e) the coordinator’s ability to integrate specialized suppliers to provide a 
full package of value-added services to international customers.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study is exploratory and conceptual in nature, the identification of the four 
coordination models was mainly based on empirical material reported in the literature; 
the analysis of multiple documents provided a broad coverage of information from 
different sources over an extended time span.  The analysis and examples of the first 
two models was carried out by using the information of cases provided by other authors 
(Carrillo, 2004; and Competitiveness Project-Vision 2020 for Mexico State) but with 
different objectives and under other theoretical frameworks; additional information 
about the structure of the shoe cluster that serves as example of Model 1 was collected 
by performing structured personal interviews with shoe producers in the town of San 
Mateo.  The description of the last two models was based on empirical primary 
information, published documents (newspaper and academic articles), web pages and 
additional documents provided by the selected companies. We conducted semi-
structured in depth interviews with the following key informants: the CEO and 
operation manager of the Mexican-USA joint venture OMJC (Original Mexican Jeans 
Co.), the founder and CEO of Aztex Trading, and two owners-CEOs of the so called 
consolidator firms that operate in the artisan region around the city of Guadalajara.  
 
Initial contact was established with each of the key informants to ask for their 
participation, all contacted firms accepted to participate in the study. Additional 
information about the objectives of the research was provided to the informants either as 
a written document or as a short presentation at the beginning of the interview. All 
interviews were conducted at the firm’s facilities; an interview guide covering the 
following dimensions was used: services and activities performed by the coordinator 
with a particular section about logistics activities, relationships with suppliers, 
relationships with customers and main challenges and contributions associated with 
their business model. All interviews were personal and lasted at least one hour and a 
half; interviews were recorded with previous authorization of the interviewee(s) and 
additional notes were taken by the researcher conducting the interview or an assistant. 
All companies authorized a visit to their facilities, complementary questions were posed 
during the visit to clarify or enhance the information previously provided during the 
interviews.  
 
Given the particular interest on the fourth coordination model, we conducted three small 
cases: Aztex Trading and two consolidator firms. In addition to the interviews with the 
owners and/or managers of these three companies and the analysis of published 
documents and web pages, we interviewed some of the producers participating in these 
sourcing networks coordinated by third parties. This additional data was used to 
complement and validate the information provided by the CEO and/or owner of the 
coordinator firm, to enhance the perspective about the structure of the coordination 
model, and to explore the interactions between the coordinator firm and producers in the 
network. This augmented information enabled us to achieve the required depth in 
describing the characteristics, benefits and drawbacks of this last model. Information 
from participant suppliers was collected during a personal interview by using a 
structured questionnaire. The suppliers, two linked to Aztex’s supplier network and 
other five which work regularly with consolidators, were referred by the firms playing 
the coordinator role and cannot be considered a representative sample of their suppliers’ 
base. 
 
 
Part 1. Four coordination models in the Mexican context 
 
I. Regional industrial clusters as auto-coordinators for the sourcing network 
The liberalization of the Mexican market imposed competitive pressures on local 
companies especially SMEs, and contributed to the disappearance of some industrial 
sectors. In an attempt to sustain and encourage industrial development, in the 90’s 
Mexican government agencies tried to develop efficient industrial agglomerations in the 
form of inter-firm networks, collaborative production-commercialization efforts 
(empresas integradoras) and industrial clusters. The objective was to develop suppliers, 
perform more value-added activities in certain strategic sectors (e.g. automotive due to 
its contribution to the manufacturing gross product), and to encourage cooperation and 
exportation among local SMEs working in traditional production markets (e.g. knitwear 
and textiles). Credit unions and producer consortia owned by local entrepreneurs were 
established to provide financial assistance, with the backup of the Mexican development 
bank, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) or with the creation of state financial funds. These 
federal initiatives, along with regional ones supported by state governments (e.g. the 
Chamber for the Transformation Industry in Nuevo Leon, Baja California through 
Competitiveness, and Competitiveness Project-Vision 2020 for Mexico State), are 
mainly oriented to support firm’s associations instead of individual firms, assuming 
collective development is less costly than individual development, and regional 
proximity and inter-firm collaboration is enough to integrate a sourcing network. A 
problem with this perspective is that inter-firm collaboration is difficult to develop due 
to lack of trust and rivalry among firms, and moreover, local inter-firm collaboration 
does not necessarily stimulate innovation and knowledge diffusion or can be taken as a 
universal characteristic of dynamic regional clusters (Malmberg and Power, 2005).  The 
Shoe cluster in the State of Mexico provides an example of a first form of coordination 
of Mexican sourcing networks, the analysis follows. 
  
Mexico has a strong tradition in shoe production, the state of Guanajuato is the main 
producer and the state of Mexico is the fourth. After the 1994 peso devaluation, shoe 
producers became interested in exporting their products. They increased their export 
volume from 3% in 1994 to 12% in 1999. However, since 2000, export volumes have 
been decreasing due to international competition with products of low price from Asia 
and Brazil. Almost all Mexican exports go to the USA market (93%) and correspond to 
products with medium price and quality; almost no exports go to Europe despite of the 
fact that the EEC is absorbing 20% of the world exports. Five percent of the total 
Mexican shoe production comes from the state of Mexico, the producers are mainly 
micro and small workshops and 40% of them are located in the town of San Mateo 
Atenco (Torres-Noyola, 2006). The production in this cluster is mainly artisan (95%) 
with only 5.6% of the larger producers using machinery and some industrialization but 
still relying on intensive labor, around 20,000 workers are linked to this shoe cluster. 
Production from workshops is characterized by poor designs and innovation, low 
technology use and heterogeneous quality, so competition is mainly on price, with retail 
points organized by the same producers inside the town. The cluster basic contribution 
is to local employment (family business) but not to region industrialization or social 
welfare; indeed tanneries in the area generate high soil and water pollution.  
  
This sourcing network is incomplete, the leather -the main raw material accounting for 
65% of product cost- is not of good quality in Mexico and its production is limited. As a 
consequence, the shoe industry relies on imports for leather (around 50%) and also 
imports basic technology (e.g. sewing machines). Mexican shoe exports are in the hands 
of the largest and more industrialized firms, that is the case in the San Mateo cluster, the 
largest shoe manufacturer sells all its production – ladies’ dress shoes- to department 
stores (Sears, Palacio de Hierro). This firm follows trendy international designs (critical 
for competition in this sector), uses high quality raw materials, and employs technology 
for production and design. This firm acquires some products from tanneries in the 
cluster and subcontracts some small producers during its peak production seasons. The 
firm is not really playing a coordinator role for cluster members, but is the critical 
cluster’s link with large buyers and the mechanism to access fashion trends; the new 
designs produced by the large firm are usually copied by small producers. Domestic 
demand has been large enough to sustain this shoe cluster but the increasing imports 
from China and Brazil (the largest American shoe producer and exporter) question the 
survival of the San Mateo cluster, unless producers become more competitive in quality 
and price.   
 
The difficulties that firms in the San Mateo shoe cluster face when they try to 
coordinate production and commercialize their products in the international market are 
not particular to the shoe cluster, Vangstrup (2002) and Domínguez-Villalobos and 
Domínguez-Villalobos (2002) describe a similar situation for the textile and apparel 
clusters in Villa Hidalgo, a town located in the West of Mexico, and the State of 
Mexico.  
 
In the case of the consortium of Villa Hidalgo, an association of domestic producers of 
garments, a Mexican entrepreneur convinced the consortium leaders to begin to export 
and put them in contact with an important USA broker interested in sourcing from 
Mexico. The two largest firms and most technically advanced firms in the consortium 
took the responsibility to prepare most of the samples required by the potential 
customers while small producers made the simplest ones. These largest companies 
assumed the coordinator role and subcontracted the small ones for production of basic 
garments and materials once a contract with the international buyer was signed. Process 
re-engineering, integration and realization of new production activities (assembly and 
finishing) required to provide full-package production were carried out by these 
coordinators. The exporting experience contributed to technology upgrading and 
productivity improvement but small producers’ dissatisfaction with the leadership of 
larger companies, lack of trust among consortium members, a limited vision about the 
economic potential of being part of a global supply chain, and financial problems finally 
ended the collaboration and export effort. 
 
The textile and apparel regional cluster in the state of Mexico is mainly oriented to the 
domestic market with limited inter-firm interactions and collaborative projects. 
Moreover, the firms in the cluster do not consider cooperation and collaboration as 
effective mechanisms for production upgrading and competitiveness (Domínguez-
Villalobos and Domínguez-Villalobos, 2002). Similar to the shoe cluster case, the 
sourcing network is incomplete, production largely depends on imports of cotton and 
synthetic fibers, and small producers in the cluster have no access to premium quality 
fibers since large textile producers prefer to serve the orders of large firms. Design 
capabilities are limited, and even though communication infrastructure is good, the 
firms in the cluster have limited logistics capabilities and are unable to aggregate their 
production to serve large volume orders. Some individual firms have tried to promote 
associations to modernize their designs and to improve their production processes. But 
these efforts are isolated and only some firms have improved the quality and design of 
their products to fulfill international standards, other producers preferred to quit and 
serve only the less demanding and low cost domestic market.  
 
Given the cluster situation, Domínguez-Villalobos and Domínguez-Villalobos (2002) 
suggest the need to develop a cluster coordinator able to perform the following basic 
functions: a) to consolidate production orders and distribute them to final customers, b) 
facilitate access to the large volume global market to SMEs, and c) support SMEs for 
product upgrading both in quality and design.  No recommendations on how to select or 
develop this coordinator agent are given, but it is suggested that a neutral third party 
could assume the cited functions, resulting in a better deployment of the financial 
resources provided by governmental agencies. 
 
This first organizational model is described graphically in Figure 1, local producers 
constitute a network with weak ties and rely mainly on governmental agencies for 
financial support, acquisition of management knowledge, in the format of non-
customized training courses, and indirect information about potential international 
buyers. The integration of local producers, coordination of the manufacturing and 
logistics activities, and the development of external links come from inside the cluster, 
provided strong social relations exist to support these actions. Key problems for the 
global competitiveness of the regional cluster are poor networking capabilities, deficient 
managerial leadership inside the cluster, pervasive lack of trust and the financial 
dependence on governmental agencies. According to the Australian cluster experience 
in Adelaide (Enright and Roberts, 2001), long-term commitment by regional producers 
and government agencies is necessary before firms accept collaboration, develop trust 
and evolve to a sourcing network. When international links are established, benefits 
include acquiring expertise on serving new markets, technical upgrading, increased 
cooperation among cluster members, and development of consolidation and logistics 
capabilities. Lead firms able to assume the coordinator role are the ones with the higher 
production capabilities but there is the risk other firms perceive this leadership as 
domination, then cooperation and interaction will decrease and the cluster will not 
evolve (Harrison, 1994). Trust levels in Latin America are reported low to medium 
(http://www.competitividadandina.org/view/new_popup.asp?id=21207&ms=4) then it 
is necessary to develop a governance structure that aligns incentives, promotes trust and 
motivates inter-firm cooperation and joint decision making. In addition, the lead firms 
in the cluster cannot offer the required financial support for the sourcing network and 
are themselves inexperienced in dealing with foreign markets, have limited capacity and 
logistics shortcomings, so they learn and help at the same time. Finally, the export 
strategy is pursued only when the domestic market shrinks, giving place to integration-
disintegration episodes for the sourcing network, which are unattractive for international 
buyers.  
 
 
Figure 1. Regional industrial clusters as auto-coordinators for the sourcing network 
 
The pure agglomeration of firms in an area is considered a state of transition in the 
development of a sourcing network; collective goals, activities coordination and the 
establishment of links with larger firms outside the region are required to avoid the risk 
of isolation. Extra-local collaboration is recognized as more important for knowledge 
creation and diffusion; successful clusters sustain cooperative relations with firms 
outside the region, their export orientation encourages the development of intra-cluster 
linkages in an effort to conform to market standards (Malmberg and Power, 2005; 
Lechner and Dowling, 1999; Vangstrup, 2002). Then, a cluster development program 
not only needs to offer financial and technical assistance or to promote meetings 
between local producers and international buyers; it is crucial to provide experience, 
additional information about cluster competencies, market intelligence services, 
infrastructure and human capital (Enright and Roberts, 2001). Therefore, the 
intervention of a neutral party taking responsibility of the cluster governance seems 
attractive, provided this entity has the leadership, vision and long-term commitment to 
develop the sourcing network. 
 
II. Sourcing networks without local links 
The example selected to profile this second coordination model is The Delphi 
case in Northern Mexico described by Carrillo (2004) in the context of the evolvement 
of the maquiladora model. This particular example was selected due to the completeness 
of the discussion provided, but other maquiladora cases exhibit a similar situation 
(Carrillo et al., 2002).  
 
Since late 1970, GM has located plants in low-priced labor regions, favouring Mexico 
due to its proximity to USA and the size of the local market. In the 80’s, maquiladora 
facilities were established at the Mexican border, and joint projects were developed with 
Mexican plants to supply GM-OEMs and auto-part plants. The spin-off of GM, Delphi, 
following the strategy of the parent company, established its own assembly plants in 
Mexico looking for low labor cost. The maquiladoras of Delphi Electric Systems and 
Switching (SEC) are mainly located at the border city of Ciudad Juárez in the state of 
Chihuahua. These maquiladoras have been through an evolution process that can be 
divided in three stages.  
1) The maquiladoras were established with no connections to local networks, and their 
production was based on intensive manual labor. The increased use and sophistication 
of wire harness promoted the development of an industrial agglomeration or cluster 
around this product, this regional cluster is a vertically integrated network of companies 
and suppliers belonging to Delphi. The cluster formation was supported by Mexican 
government institutions via a program aimed to strengthen manufacturing supply chains 
and upgrade suppliers’ capabilities. However, few Mexican suppliers actually 
participate in the network, due to their limited competitiveness in quality, cost, delivery 
times and productive capacity, plus the disinterest of Delphi plants to support their 
upgrading, therefore their participation is limited to low value-added activities like 
cardboard packing and machine shop parts.  
2) Delphi suppliers, under the tight control of the company, went through a learning 
process and became competitive by offering quality products (ISO and QS 
certification), cutting waste, shortening production cycles, and managing promised 
delivery times. They successfully adopted the Japanese system of production and were 
able to adjust to demand fluctuations. Even when employment turnover rates were high, 
effective training programs were implemented and technical skilled labor was attracted 
as plant size increased.  
3) In the third stage, Delphi plants were not only oriented to assembly or manufacturing; 
they also participated in the integration of design, research and development with 
manufacturing. Intra-firm networks were created and new plants were located in other 
regions of the country. Along with the diffusion of lean manufacturing practices, there 
were also changes in human management practices. High skilled labor (engineers and 
high-level technicians) was attracted and local universities and technical schools began 
to offer careers to cover the increasing demand for competent human resources.  
 
Through these stages, auto part maquiladoras linked to Delphi have experienced an 
upgrading industrial process, they are not just assembly plants but are also able to 
decide the manufacturing infrastructure and procedures required to go from design to 
production. Despite these qualifications, they do not participate in high value added 
activities such as design and marketing which are under total control of the lead firm 
Delphi. These auto part maquiladoras have made a substantial contribution to 
employment (skilled and unskilled labor) in the Chihuahua region, and they are 
technologically advanced and innovative in process and management practices. 
However these benefits are limited to the members of the Delphi vertical network, 
participation of local suppliers in the global network has not been realized. The 
transnational OEMs have not pursued a more indigenous strategy nor considered local 
co-development as part of their international sourcing activity. Another problem with 
this model is the supplier’s over-dependence on the lead firm for decision making and 
production consumption.  This situation contributes to the vulnerability of the whole 
sourcing network, and tends to occur when the OEM is a spin-off of the lead firm in the 
entire supply chain. The demand decrement for USA automobiles, GM in particular, has 
an immediate effect on Delphi production which resulted in plants closure or relocation 
into lower wage regions, and the subsequent deterioration of the region’s social welfare.  
 
The presence of a TNC as the promoter and coordinator of a sourcing network does not 
necessarily imply low participation of local producers. In the case of the Malaysian state 
of Penang, the semiconductor industry has grown with the participation of local 
producers. The TNC perceptions about local support structures, the industry rapid 
technological changes, and the need for short order cycles drove TNC decisions to 
extensively subcontract machine tooling and intensify local linkages. As a consequence 
of these actions, local firms improved their production and managerial practices and 
encouraged their suppliers to introduce statistical process control, scheduling and 
accounting methods (Doner and Hershberg, 1999). In Penang, the governmental policy 
not only promoted industrial decentralization and offered incentives to TNC to relocate 
in the region, but assured the provision of a high quality labor force (technicians and 
engineers); and supported the SMEs with training programs and market information 
(Rasiah, 2002). Therefore, state programs should look not only for exogenous growth 
by promoting foreign direct investment but for endogenous growth by creating the 
conditions to strengthen the links between local producers and TNCs.  
 
Figure 2 describes this second type of coordination of the sourcing network; the figure 
recognizes the problem of a reduced number of foreign buyers absorbing the OEM 
production. The reintegration of the automotive supply chains by the formation of 
parallel segments coordinated by OEMs that sustain collaborative as well as competitive 
interrelationships among them is questionable in terms of the participation and 
upgrading of lower tier suppliers and the increased portfolio of responsibilities of OEMs 
(Whitford y Zeitlin 2004; Bitran et al., 2006). These companies still retain the control in 
their respective value chains and exert significant pressures on their supply base to be 
efficient and attain cost reductions, and to align their individual objectives with the 
strategy of the OEMs resulting in inferior revenues for suppliers, low motivation for 
collaboration and the chance of decentralized production (Helper et al., 2000). Given 
the increased portfolio of responsibilities faced by OEMs they are transferring the same 
scheme of coordination to second tier suppliers, which establish hierarchical relations 
and vertical knowledge interchanges with third and fourth tier suppliers.  Participation 
of domestic suppliers in such networks is restricted to those suppliers able to develop 
the required capabilities and production standards, then the need for public policies 
offering affordable managerial, technical and training resources to upgrade  domestic 
suppliers is identified (Whitford y Zeitlin, 2004).  
  
 Figure 2. Sourcing networks without local links 
 
III. Industrial clusters linked to global supply chains  
 The so called Lagunera region is a dynamic industrial cluster with a high 
concentration of firms in the apparel sector, particularly focused in blue jeans 
production. The main industrial parks are located around the city of Torreón in the 
northern state of Coahuila and others in the city of Gómez Palacio in the central-north 
state of Durango. The Lagunera region has a cotton textile and apparel tradition with a 
strong export-oriented maquiladora sector and has a good communication infrastructure 
permitting an easy connection with the USA. Before NAFTA (1993), clusters of local 
firms were serving the local market or were assembly subcontractors without horizontal 
ties among them. A few USA manufacturers and brokers were the lead firms in these 
networks since they dominated the access to the international market and provided the 
inputs for assembly, so local producers were dependent on the orders placed by these 
lead firms. NAFTA and the 1994 peso devaluation contributed to the reduction of labor 
costs and elimination of non-monetary barriers for all production activities in the region. 
The decrease in production costs promoted the entrance of new lead firms, brand 
marketers (e.g. Polo, Calvin Klein, Liz Claiborne, Tommy Hilfiger), retailers (e.g. Wal-
Mart, JCPenney, Sears) and international producers (e.g. Sun Apparel) looking for  full-
package production in the region. The entrance of these large foreign producers, 
marketers and retailers with high-volume orders and demands for more expensive and 
high-quality jeans contributed to the growth of the industrial region as well as the 
upgrading of production capabilities to fulfill quality international standards (Gereffi et 
al. 2002).  
 
The expansion of the Lagunera region during the 90’s was supported by the emergence 
of full-package producers which represent an evolution from the initial maquiladoras 
concentrated only in assembly. Full-package production requires performing several 
productive activities beyond assembly such as translating and adapting design to 
production, cutting, and finishing process (laundering and pressing in the case of 
apparel). Besides performing multiple manufacturing activities, full-production also 
requires the efficient integration and coordination with textile producers and suppliers 
of accessories and threads to attend the buyer’s demands in a particular product line. To 
develop full-package production, Mexican firms with capital and expertise established 
successful associations with USA firms. Among these partnerships figure Original 
Mexican Jeans Company (OMJC group) one of the largest producers of jeans in the 
region, and Parras-Cone an association between a North Carolina mill company with 
one of the oldest and largest Mexican textile companies. OMJC group is the example 
we selected to describe this third form of coordination of a sourcing network.  
 
OMJC was formed in 1992 as a joint venture between the USA manufacturer Aalfs and 
the Mexican Martín-Soberón producers; the objective was to take advantage of NAFTA 
and the low labor costs. In 1995, direct investment was made to expand facilities to 
include laundry, finishing and packing activities; and in 1999 a distribution center with 
capacity of 150,000 ft2 was open with the objective to improve delivery times, reduce 
costs, improve customer service (98% is the established service level), and facilitate the 
implementation of Vendor Management Programs (initial VMI was established in 2003 
with GAP). Textiles, the most important raw material to OMJC are imported, mainly 
from USA and Canada, but Mexican fibers are also used (40% is domestic product) and 
supplied by Parras-Cone. OMJC sustains an alliance with this major textile producer 
and also a close relation with two local laundries because the increased complexity and 
duration of finishing activities has resulted in a differential between OMJC capacities 
for production and finishing. Then the relation with other major local producers 
specialized in particular activities is relevant to assure the integration of the apparel 
sourcing network. 
 
At the beginning of 2000 when Asia gained advantage for apparel production at low 
cost, OMJC and all the firms in the Lagunera region faced a strong contraction of the 
demand. OMJC responded by augmenting their innovation and design capacities so they 
could move from producing standardized, large volume and low cost orders to the 
production of small orders of more value added products in alignment with fashion 
trends. To support this market re-orientation, OMJC has invested in a design and 
research center that develops and experiments with new dyes, textures and finishing for 
textiles. OMJC does not participate in the design and assembly of the jeans -the other 
critical activity included in the design phase- this activity is performed by the USA 
counterpart, Aalfs, in conjunction with the customer. The jeans’ design is submitted via 
Internet to OMJC which analyzes its production’ viability and prepares the samples to 
be approved by the customer. Actual customers include JCPenney, GAP, Old Navy, 
Tommy Hilfiger, Abercrombie & Fitch, Duck Head (Aalfs own brand) and Harley 
Davidson. 
 
Joint ventures are not uncommon business arrangements but this example is interesting 
because of the clear division of activities between the two firms so the association 
successfully matches the demand and supply sides. OMJC is the organization 
responsible of all production activities including the acquisition, test and innovation of 
textiles meanwhile Aalfs is responsible of the logistics and commercialization activities 
as well as the administration of relations with customers. The synchronization of 
activities of both firms results in an effective coordination model: Aalfs coordinates the 
flow of goods and information between the end customers and OMJC with respect to a 
particular product line, hence, the USA part administrates the knowledge about 
international requirements and creates/sustains the links with USA buyers; OMJC has 
the knowledge about local manufacturing capabilities, and it is in a better position to 
coordinate all the production activities, distribute production loads and consolidate the 
orders fabricated at its various facilities. OMJC also controls the participation to the 
sourcing network of textile producers and firms specialized in finishing activities, with 
preference for a reduced number of close partnerships with well established firms 
(Parras-Cone and the laundries) specialized in the initial (textile production) and final 
(laundering and finishing) activities of the productive chain which contribute to the 
differentiation of the products.   
 
Positive results of the re-orientation of OMJC’s strategy include improved wages and 
conditions for workers to compliance with customer’s policies (regular supervision 
visits and audits are performed by customers), skill upgrading, active participation in 
the innovation and design of new textiles, and preservation of critical but few backward 
linkages. But despite OMJC productive competitiveness, front-end activities such as 
marketing and customer’s relation management are still dominated by the USA firm 
(Aalfs) which has even developed its own high-prestige brand. Another problem with 
this model is again the overdependence on a few USA customers, to OMJC the unique 
customer is Aalfs which absorbs all production and distributes it to customers, so 
reduction in demand affects the full-package network.  At the strategic level, Aalfs still 
serves the high volume and low cost market by producing in Pakistan and Nicaragua 
while the Mexican facilities are dedicated to serve customers that require lower volumes 
but demand flexibility, delivery times, high quality, and products with high value added 
through innovation and design.  
 
This vertically integrated sourcing network has emerged and grown thanks to the 
following conditions: a) the development of full-package production supported by direct 
investment of the USA and Mexican firms, b) the location of the sourcing network in a 
region with textile & apparel production tradition, technological and logistics 
capabilities, capital availability and entrepreneurship activity, and c) the export-oriented 
strategy of the coordinator firm. These characteristics are in alignment with the Greater 
Tucson Strategic Plan (Enright and Roberts, 2001 pp. 78) with respect to the 
characteristics of firms cited as critical for the development of a sourcing network: 
stable firms with the capacity to be globally competitive, that use significant local labor 
and suppliers, support export-oriented business and with the best potential for joint 
international ventures. Figure 3 describes this third type of coordination model where 
the coordinator combines the expertise of local and foreign manufacturers to create and 
sustain backward and forward links. A problem with this model is again that upgrading 
and knowledge sharing is restricted to the participants owned by the manufacturers 
which buy from local suppliers without promoting partnerships with or among them.  
 
 
Figure 3. Industrial clusters linked to global supply chains 
 
 
IV. Sourcing networks coordinated by a trader 
Traders are not members of the supply chain but neutral third parties connecting 
suppliers’ clusters with the international market. These firms are not just brokers, they 
are in charge of the integration (information interchanges and development of 
communication and collaborative performance systems) and coordination of all the 
activities (production, order consolidation and logistics) related to the sourcing of a 
particular product line. These firms do not have manufacturing facilities of their own 
but have the capacity to facilitate production because of their knowledge about regional 
production capabilities and their abilities to network multiple suppliers and establish 
links with international buyers.  
 These intermediaries are widespread in East Asia (Bair and Gereffi, 2002) but still 
emerging in Mexico, the most notorious Asian case, already described, is Li & Fung 
which has evolved from its original trader position to become a SC coordinator or 
“mini-maestro”. The two cases in this section describe the role of Mexican traders as 
coordinators of sourcing networks, the identified traders are not as advanced in their 
services and capabilities as Li & Fung, but resemble the position of this company at the 
beginning of the 90’s. As previously mentioned, we provide an extended discussion for 
this last model given the interest in the identification of third parties approaching the 
role of “mini-maestro” and in order to develop additional knowledge about the profile 
of service companies able to play this role.  
 
Case a. Tonalá and Tlaquepaque Consolidators  
Tonalá and Tlaquepaque are two small towns located near Guadalajara with a 
strong handcraft tradition. In 1998, there were 925 small-medium handcraft producers 
in Tlaquepaque and 1875 in Tonalá, these SMEs produce a high variety of customized 
products (sculptures, pottery, glass, maché paper figures, furniture, ceramics, etc.). The 
region is actively involved in exports, mainly to USA, Canada and some European 
countries. Most of the producers do not export directly; exporting activity is dominated 
by intermediaries like brokers and consolidators (this term is used in the region to 
denominate traders), which play a critical role in the products commercialization and 
export by serving as knowledge links between producers and buyers, these 
consolidators contribute to the handicraft districts development and sustainability 
(Mercado, 2002, 2006). 
 
Production capacity is usually limited and insufficient to fulfill large orders, also 
product quality and prices are variable, but SMEs have diversified their production 
techniques to attain high flexibility and pursue specialization and originality instead of 
standardization. They have good capabilities to customize products according to trendy 
designs although they are not identified as design innovators; they tend to replicate 
saleable designs. These firms sustain kinship ties and constitute a close community 
expanded through family linkages. The handicraft producers subcontract and acquire 
raw material (glass, iron, clay and wood) from other family members or former 
employees located in the same region, resulting in full-package production under a 
unique family or workshop name. The demand for these hand-made products is 
constantly changing and there is an intense entrance and exit of buyer firms. SMEs have 
developed strategies to search and find clients and rely heavily on their participation in 
local and national trade exhibitions and the creation of commercial districts serving as 
wholesale points for international buyers. In general, all small producers in the area are 
willing to participate in these commercial districts because they recognize the 
importance of external links for the sustainability of their production (Mercado 2002, 
2006).  
 
The majority of the consolidators limit their services to the consolidation of the 
production of multiple suppliers serving a unique customer. The regular services 
portfolio includes: transport subcontracting and negotiation, preparation of all the export 
documents (e.g. certificate of origin, bill of lading and shipping manifest), supervision 
to custom brokers and administration of payments. But some of the consolidators have 
enhanced their services and play an active role in the upgrading of artisans’ capabilities. 
This is the case of RRR∗, a small service company located in Tonalá which has been in 
operation for 22 years. The owner of this company actively promotes the abilities of the 
handicraft producers among international buyers -mainly home designers, architectures, 
retailers and wholesale distributors of handicrafts of USA origin- and serves customers 
that look for value added and reliable services over low price. Customers rely 
completely on RRR for quality control, and also for special packing and labeling 
(plastic racks instead of wood, no paper bags, bar coding in products, etc.). 
Transportation is subcontracted, but RRR uses USA containers on Mexican trucks to 
facilitate the transfer of goods at the border, and maintains close relations with Mexican 
and USA custom brokers based on its reputation.  
 
The company sustains close, long term and trustworthy relations with around 150 
suppliers of different products (glass, wood, furniture, ceramics, etc.) and absorbs 
between 10-80% of their production. Those suppliers that have been strongly supported 
by RRR to improve product quality and develop/transfer new designs have become 
exclusive. RRR helps handicraft producers in multiple ways: supports suppliers in the 
identification and acquisition of raw materials (e.g. new paints), transfers design and 
supervises production, always respecting the individuality of artisans. RRR also assists 
producers to perform the required tests to fulfill international security standards (e.g. 
lead content in pottery) and helps them to solve technical problems, to elaborate budgets 
and to regularize their fiscal situation. Submitted orders are carefully revised to 
guarantee product quality, with basic quality specifications even defined by RRR. If 
some of the producers do not deliver orders on time or orders are incomplete, the 
consolidator establishes contact with the producer to inform and correct the situation. In 
                                                 
∗ The owner of the firm asked for anonymity, therefore firm’s name is omitted in the discussion.   
the occasional event that a customer does not pay for his order, RRR shares the loss 
with the involved suppliers. The existing reciprocal ties allow the on-going resolution of 
problems and the diffusion of best production practices.  
 
Another relevant example of a sourcing network coordinated by a third party is the 
Mexican designer-consolidator identified as AAA∗. AAA is closely related to one of the 
most traditional consolidators in Tlaquepaque. This consolidator supported AAA to 
establish links with qualified suppliers and valuable customers, and transferred the 
knowledge about production capabilities and market preferences and needs. AAA 
subcontracts the services of this consolidator to deliver the orders to the USA 
customers. AAA also subcontracts production to around 80 workshops, absorbing 
around 30-80% of their capacity. AAA grants special credits to the suppliers in its 
network so they can begin production or acquire new machinery. Regular production is 
not usually supervised by AAA, the company relies on the outstanding abilities of the 
producers, and if production is not acceptable, rework and losses are shared or absorbed 
by AAA in an effort to develop suppliers’ loyalty. AAA also supports its suppliers in 
the acquisition of raw materials, with the introduction of innovative finishing and 
protection processes, and with new design transference. For some products, AAA 
performs finishing activities or makes final assembly. Protection of AAA designs is 
difficult; some of the suppliers become exclusive if they are dedicated to production of 
original designs.  
 
The owners of these consolidator companies have a profound knowledge of the 
producer and buyer culture and environment that allows them to take advantage of local 
                                                 
∗ The owner of the firm asked for anonymity, therefore firm’s name is omitted in the discussion. 
governmental policies (e.g. tax exemption). These consolidators sustain stable and long-
term relationships based on trust and loyalty with the producers, communication is more 
intense when new designs or samples are required. The accumulated knowledge 
consolidators have about outstanding artisan capabilities and USA buyers’ preferences 
allow them to function as a “cultural bridge” between the artisan producers and the 
international buyers. The artisan network is visualized as a repository of experiences, 
tacit knowledge, social and family ties that have been absorbed (RRR case) or indirectly 
transferred to the consolidator (AAA case). The intervention of these companies in the 
buyer-driven chain has contributed to the development of a good reputation for the 
handicraft abilities and reliability of the local producers and promoted the development 
of new products and designs attending to international trends. Originality and 
innovation in design for the handcraft chain is equivalent to research and innovation for 
product-driven chains, by creating own designs based on popular art (AAA) or by 
transferring information about fashionable designs (RRR), the consolidators are not 
only coordinating production but also have an active participation in the high-value 
activity of design. 
Consolidators maintain an open and continuous communication with customers and 
producers; however interaction with producers is closer, personal and on a regular basis 
while interaction with customers is intermittent and via telephone or e-mail. 
Consolidators facilitate the exportation of relatively large volumes of handicrafts; the 
delivery of small orders to international end-customers is performed by regular carriers 
(e.g. DHL) under the direct responsibility of the final customer.  
 
Case b) Aztex Trading  
Another identified supply chain coordinator, not part of the chain, is Aztex 
Trading S. A. de C. V. (http://www.aztex.net). This firm is defined as a “service and 
knowledge company” which provides customers a full-service package, from finding 
the fabrics and adapting or innovating textile’s designs, identifying manufacturing 
subcontractors, developing products according to specifications, consolidating 
production and assuring quality and on-time delivery. Aztex is classified by Mexican 
rules as a consolidator agent, this classification gives the company the privilege to buy 
products for export from Mexican manufactures without paying the regular purchasing 
taxes, thanks to this advantage, Aztex can pass savings to its international customers. 
 
The trading company, based in Mexico City, has an experience of 15 years and has been 
awarded several prizes including the National Prize for Exporting for 
Commercialization Enterprises in 2000. Aztex has a staff of 40 people working along 
the 16 offices located around the country (North, Bajío, Central and Southeast). The 
Aztex personnel include specialists who develop or locate raw materials, and certify and 
develop new suppliers; textile engineers in charge of production supervision, quality 
inspectors, and a staff supporting logistics activities. Information technology (IT) is 
used for communication and information interchanges with the regional offices but 
intense personal interchanges characterize the relations with the producers.  
 
According to Patricia Medina, founder of the company, and Aztex’ CEO, the company 
was in the past more a “production supervisor” than a trader, Aztex used to supply 
orders from international brand owners –Liz Liz Clairborne, Boss, Nautica, Dockers, 
ESPRIT, Polo Jeans Co. and JNY- looking for the advantages of low cost labor, 
geographical proximity to the USA and governmental policies favourable to 
exportation. But when all these customers decided to source from Asia at the beginning 
of 2000, Aztex’s strategy changed radically and the company redirected its strategy to 
serve large and prestigious local retailers and brand owners, actual customers include 
two of the most important Mexican departmental chains - Liverpool and Palacio de 
Hierro- retailers like Julio and Ivonne and brand owners like Maringo. These new 
Aztex’s customers are looking not just for high volume and low prices, but for top 
quality, flexibility and reliability, and they recognize the value added services provided 
by the trader and the convenience of local production to reduce order cycle times.  
 
Aztex services include the sourcing of threads, textiles and accessories, advising 
customers and producers about trendy textile and garment designs, preparation of 
samples, production planning, order tracking, quality assurance, order consolidation and 
final delivery at the warehouse of the customer. The coordinator services of this trader 
does not only cover production activities, but also all the logistics required to move raw 
materials and trimmings to multiple production facilities, the administration and 
movement of inventory in process, the consolidation of orders at Aztex’s warehouse in 
Mexico city and the final delivery to the customer. Logistics planning is performed at 
the executive level, and execution is completed with the assistance of a third party that 
provides the transportation service. No information technologies are used to track orders 
or to interchange information with customer about order status, but there are clear 
pathways and dates to be satisfied that are regularly revised to assure customer service.   
 
Aztex’s executives confirm that garment assembly has been the long-established and 
exclusive activity for many Mexican firms, but recognize this is an insufficient 
production capability to satisfy international buyers. The textile & garment chain 
involves the suppliers of raw materials (threads, textiles and multiple trimmings), the 
firms that launder and finish the textiles (laundries), and the ones that design the 
patterns and cut the fabric. At the end of the chain, there are the assemblers or 
confectioners (maquileros) and other firms that do the dying and stitching. The activities 
of all these integrants of the garment chain are required to have full-package production; 
Aztex coordinates and synchronizes all these activities to effectively fill the “holes” in 
the textile & garment supply chain. These “holes” in the chain include not only 
production but also logistics activities such as the transportation at a competitive price, 
of small and frequent volumes of semi-finished and finished products among the 
different regions where the specialized suppliers are located.  
 
Another important achievements of Aztex as system integrator is the reduction of the 
order cycle by decreasing the length of the design transference phase. Aztex is able to 
produce and deliver a particular garment in eight weeks on average, versus the six 
months required to produce in Asia where delivery time is around half of the phase 
duration. Aztex’s executives indicated that this time reduction also decreases the 
uncertainty about product’s acceptability and the need for markdowns at the end of 
season. When garments are produced six months in advance, the risk of low 
acceptability (poor sales) is estimated in 50% but when garments are produced two 
months before the season when more information about market trends and preferences 
is available, the risk of poor sales is reduced to 20%.  
Aztex supports suppliers in translating design to production, promotes their raw 
material and designs (textiles in particular), assists them in the development of a 
proposal for the customer, provides information about recent fashion trends in the 
international market, conducts qualitative market research studies to market test new 
textile’s designs and gives feedback about the acceptance of the garments fabricated 
under its management. Aztex’s original supplier network was formed after the 
development of a supplier directory; suppliers with export experience located at 
different regions in Mexico were selected (Hernández, 2002) but the directory is 
continuously updated according to market needs and the evolvement of the supplier’s 
base. Aztex’s executives consider critical to sustain close and personal relations with 
suppliers, and to understand their cultural and work preferences, these interactions are 
judged critical to develop trust and collaboration and to assure their compromise and 
loyalty. The coordination of a supply network that is geographically dispersed around 
the country calls not only for synchronization of activities but also for the development 
and management of horizontal linkages between members specialized in the different 
activities that constitute the apparel supply chain. 
 
Aztex’s interaction with customers is intense only during the design phase, but once 
customers have selected the season’s catalog, they trust Aztex to perform all the 
activities required to fulfill the order and to deliver it on the promised time. Actual 
customers do not ask for an order tracking system, regular reports or continuous 
communication, they rely completely on Aztex’s services and just expect for their 
orders to be delivered as expected. Aztex’s executives state that customers are not 
interested in supervising production or logistics activities, “that’s why they contract us, 
it’s our job”. New Aztex’s customers are focused on end clients that value design 
originality, quality and clothes’ fitness (well shaped and adjusted to local taste and 
physical complexion). Aztex’s customers do not want to acquire high volumes of 
garments with designs similar to the ones carried by competitors, and try to avoid 
frequent markdowns. Therefore, they prefer to buy small volumes of products with 
exclusive designs and made with high quality/original fabrics. By buying small lots of 
garments, the department stores and retailing chains renovate frequently their stock, so 
they can offer a “fresh” and distinctive image to end customers and sell most of the 
seasonal products at regular price. To support its customers’ strategy, Aztex gathers 
information about international fashion trends (top executives travel regularly to fashion 
centers in Europe) to advise customers about new designs and to enhance the initial 
catalog proposed by each customer at the beginning of the season. Then actual Aztex’s 
benchmarks are not the low-cost Asian textile-garment chains but the ones linked to 
European customers like those developing in Turkey; these chains do not compete on 
low price and high volume but on mass customization and flexibility.  
 
Figure 4 describes this last type of coordination model identified in Mexico. The trader 
(represented by the specific cases of consolidators and Aztex) is identified in the figure 
as the SC coordinator which constitutes the basic link between production and demand 
sides. The SC coordinator tenders to the buyer a valuable and integral package of 
services, including design, production and logistics, and to the supplier side the link 
with the international market without the need to perform other activities besides 
specialized production. The cases show Mexican SC coordinators have strong 
backward linkages and have developed knowledge about the production capabilities, 
organizational culture and business negotiation styles prevailing in their sourcing 
networks. This knowledge is not enough to orchestrate the network, companies with 
intra-cluster links have this expertise but have not been successful (Model 1) because 
their neutrality and leadership was not recognized by suppliers. Independent traders 
have a better opportunity to evolve to SC coordinators or mini-maestros because they 
do not belong to the sourcing network and therefore suppliers do not feel dominated or 
in competition with them. Suppliers remain independent since they are not owned or 
work exclusively with the SC coordinator, and therefore can allocate their remaining 
production with other buyers if they find it convenient. Another advantage of traders or 
consolidators as SC coordinators is that they serve multiple customers; this assures 
stability in order volumes so suppliers and trader are not too dependent on a single 
buyer. 
 
Traders are also in a better position to open forward linkages with respect to local 
manufacturing firms with an export orientation. This advantage is because they are 
service oriented companies, and therefore have developed different competencies and a 
stronger customer-orientation than manufacturers. Large manufacturing firms acting as 
coordinators could compete with the focal company in the entire supply chain, for 
example some of the large full-package producers located in the Lagunera region could 
turn into Original Brand Manufacturers (OBMs) once they have acquired the links and 
absorbed their former partner’ knowledge about the international market (e.g. Lajat 
Group purchased its USA counterpart Kentucky and the Mexican manufacturer Siete 
Leguas ended its partnership with Sun Apparel once it acquired enough export 
expertise). But traders like Aztex do not represent direct competition because they are 
service companies fully devoted to coordinate their customer’s sourcing network.  
 
 Figure 4. Sourcing networks coordinated by a trader 
 
The following table summarizes our description and contrasts the four models 
with respect to several dimensions identified as critical.  
 
Table 1. Comparison among four organizational models for SC coordination 
Dimension Regional 
industrial clusters 
as auto-
coordinators for 
the sourcing 
network 
Sourcing 
networks without 
local links 
Industrial clusters 
linked to a global 
supply chain 
Sourcing 
networks 
coordinated by 
traders 
Profile of the SC 
coordinator 
The largest and 
more 
entrepreneurial 
manufacturing 
firms in the cluster 
OEMs serving as 
first tier suppliers 
of TNCs, or 
dominant firms 
belonging to the 
SC  
Joint ventures or 
partnerships 
between large 
local and 
international 
manufacturers, 
both integrants of 
SC 
Local or 
international 
service and 
knowledge firms: 
traders, brokers, 
neutral third 
parties 
Production and 
logistics activities 
Performed by 
producers in the 
cluster, assistance 
from governmental 
agencies and 
industrial groups 
Performed by the 
SC coordinator, 
logistics possibly 
performed by 
3PLs 
Performed by the 
SC coordinator, 
logistics possibly 
performed by 
3PLs 
Production 
supervised by the 
trader, logistics 
could be 
performed by the 
coordinator or by 
3PLs 
Participation of 
domestic 
producers 
Intense and direct Indirect and 
limited 
Direct but limited Intense and direct 
Suppliers’ control No control, 
voluntary 
participation to 
constitute the 
sourcing network
Tight control, 
suppliers owned 
by SC coordinator 
Tight control, 
suppliers owned 
by SC coordinator 
No control, 
voluntary 
participation to 
constitute the 
sourcing network
Suppliers 
upgrading 
Ineffective and 
with high 
differentials, 
mainly related to 
conformance to 
In product and 
process, but no 
participation in 
high-value added 
activities 
In product and 
process, but no 
participation in 
high-value added 
activities 
In product and 
process 
international 
quality standards 
Contribution at 
regional level 
Employment and 
industrialization, 
increased export 
activity 
Employment, 
human resource 
upgrading, 
industrialization 
and export 
Employment, 
human resource 
upgrading, 
industrialization 
and export 
Sustainability and 
competitiveness of 
existing SMEs, 
more export 
activity 
Type of network Horizontal 
integration 
supported by 
social networks 
Vertical 
integration, mainly 
arm-length ties 
Vertical 
integration, mainly 
arm-length ties 
Horizontal 
integration, 
partnership ties 
Coordinator 
effectiveness 
Ineffective, limited 
capabilities, 
(financial, 
logistics, 
establishment of 
forward linkages) 
Effective, high 
production 
expertise, with 
financial resources 
and forward 
linkages.  
Effective, high 
production 
expertise, with 
financial resources 
and both backward 
and forward 
linkages 
Effective, high 
networking 
capabilities, 
profound 
knowledge about 
local producer 
capabilities, 
customer and 
service oriented
 
 
Part 2:  Sourcing Networks Coordinated by Emerging Mini-maestros 
 
The description of the cases of Mexican traders identified as emerging 
coordinators is extended in this section by presenting a detailed identification of all 
activities in the supply chain performed or administrated by the trader, a diagram 
depicting the role of the trader in the supply chain, and the recognition of those 
activities usually poorly executed or in need to be improved if the trader is going to be 
acknowledged as mini-maestro.  
 
The map of the logistics supply chain which was used to analyze our findings, shows 
how the trader manages the product, information and cash flows to structure a flexible 
supply chain according to the customer’s needs, as well as the interactions between the 
trader and other SC participants. The logistics supply chain maps were constructed by 
using the UPS Supply Chain Process Flow template. The additional information 
collected from suppliers was used to complete the analysis. 
 Production in the chain is the responsibility of competent suppliers selected and 
supervised by the SC coordinator then production is not usually problematic. Deficient 
activities are mainly related to logistics, the options for the trader to improve them are: 
a) the development of additional capabilities to cover the deficiencies and even 
capitalize on them like Li & Fung does through the IDS group, or b) the selection and 
administration of competent and reliable logistics providers (3PLs). This second 
alternative opens the opportunity for the participation of other third parties in the 
network that will be coordinated by the trader in a similar way that it coordinates 
multiple producers and carriers. The establishment of collaborative partnerships with 
such external agents can be an effective means to overcome the weak logistics abilities 
of the trader.  
 
Case a. Tonalá and Tlaquepaque Consolidators  
Five micro to small producers linked to consolidators were interviewed. All of 
them are family businesses; three are specialized in a particular line of products (glass, 
pottery and furniture made from iron) and the others manufacture or commercialize a 
broad variety of products. They sell directly in the area, but export part of their 
production (25-90%) mainly via the consolidators. All suppliers agree consolidators 
facilitate the exportation process and supports producers to assure appropriate delivery 
times, allowing them to concentrate on production. However the artisan’s perceptions 
about the extent of benefits derived from the relation with the consolidators differs. The 
pottery producer perceives low value added by the consolidators’ services, meanwhile 
the other two specialized producers consider the relation with the consolidators as an 
opportunity to acquire information about trendy designs, fulfill international standards, 
and acquire new customers. Two of the five artisans also consider their relations with 
the consolidators have helped them to introduce new designs and materials and to 
maintain or even increase their sales volume. Column 1 in Table 2 describes in detail 
the activities executed or administrated by the consolidators and the second column 
shows those activities particularly related to the development of the artisan producers. 
 
Table 2. Consolidators in the artisan Guadalajara area: services and activities to support 
the suppliers’ development 
Case Portfolio of services Supporting activities to suppliers 
RRR Logistics activities 
Consolidation of the orders of a unique 
customer 
Order verification (completeness, quality, 
composition) 
Supervision of custom brokers (USA and 
Mexico) 
Transportation management. Carriers are 
selected to take advantage of NAFTA 
 
 
Design  
Adaptation of customer’s design production 
capabilities of local producers 
Supervision of design’s transference to  
production 
Production 
Quality control of final goods 
Tests to final products to guarantee safety 
according to international standards 
Finishing, packing and labeling 
Finance and accounting 
Administration of payments to suppliers  
Consolidation of supplier’s invoices to prepare a 
unique invoice and an official document for 
exportation 
- Promotion of designs and protection of 
their originality 
- Assistance during the transference of 
design to production 
- Assures to (exclusive) suppliers in 
network a stable volume of sales 
- Acquisition of raw materials  
- Technical advice during production and  
transference from design to production  
- Consultancy about accounting and costing 
issues 
- Price and payment negotiation 
- Payment claim and recovery 
- Share risks with suppliers  
AAA Logistics activities 
Consolidation of orders of a unique customer 
Subcontracts transportation and exporting to 
consolidator A 
Design  
Creates original designs according to 
international preferences 
Production 
Subcontracts manufacturing to multiple 
suppliers 
Quality control of final goods 
Finishing, packing and labeling 
Finance and accounting 
Administration of payments to suppliers
- Assistance during the transference of 
design to production 
- Credit to closest suppliers for raw material 
acquisition 
- Acquisition of raw materials 
- Assures to (exclusive) suppliers in 
network a stable volume of sales and 
continuous renovation of designs 
- Share risks with suppliers  
 Figure 5 depicts graphically the map of the logistics supply chain for these two 
consolidators, those activities or links that represent areas of opportunity are identified 
and marked in the diagram as opportunities for the participation of logistics providers; 
these specific activities are additionally explained after the diagram.  
 
Figure 5. Consolidators in the artisan Guadalajara area: 
 Supply chain process flow and identification of challenging activities 
 
Supply Chain Activities Challenges / Critical points 
1) Sourcing of raw materials a) Identification of materials with acceptable quality (e.g. 
wood, paint)  
b) Local shortages and high costs of raw materials (e.g. iron) 
2) Verification of order a) Quality assurance of final goods (major defects) 
b) Order composition (quantity discrepancies) 
3) Order delivery a) Suppliers do not satisfy delivery times (late delivery) 
b) Unreliable and cost competitive transportation services 
c) Transportation acceptable only for FTL, reduction of 
transportation costs for LTL and small packages 
4) Payment management Direct payment to producers to avoid payments’ delays and 
deception to artisans 
5) Order documentation Consolidation of multiple invoices
6) Custom brokering a) Delays when crossing the border due to queues and revision  
b) Product damage because of improper material handling 
during inspection 
7) Market diversification a) Competitive prices, Chinese products are cheapest but some 
are not hand-made or materials are of inferior quality 
b) Reinforcement of handicraft image (originality, creativity, 
quality) 
 
Case b) AztexTrading  
Aztex’s executives consider the company maintains symbiotic relations with 
suppliers in its network; however the interviews we conducted with the sales manager 
of two important suppliers linked to the Aztex’s network, Mission Blues and Garment 
Washer (MB & GW from now on) both located in the Lagunera region, and with the 
general director of a textile company (referred to in this paper as FFF*) located in the 
state of Mexico, which is a minor supplier of Aztex, indicate that relations and benefits 
vary depending on the capacities and market position of the supplier. MB & GW were 
integrated to Aztex’s supplier directory due to the high quality and competitive cost of 
their production. MB is dedicated to manufacturing while GW is specialized in 
finishing; both suppliers have developed strong design and customization capabilities 
that along with their production abilities allow them to offer services of assembly, half-
package and full-package production. MB & GW combine their abilities to provide full-
package production, under this scheme MB/GW also participates in the development of 
new designs – of both textiles and garments- according to customer’s preferences and/or 
submitted samples. During the design phase, MB/GW works in conjunction with 
Archetype, once the client has selected and approved products, Archetype receives the 
                                                 
* The general director asked for anonymity, therefore the company’s name is omitted in the discussion. 
order and submits it to MB/GW for its production, once the order is completed, it is sent 
to a distribution center located in the city of Laredo at the USA-Mexican border.  
 
MB & GW usually provide only assembly or half-package services to Aztex, the trader 
supplies the entire designs and all or part of the textiles and trimmings required to 
fabricate the products. Then Aztex is viewed by MB/GW as another customer that 
demands trendy and high quality garments with a “perfect” fit. As other competitive 
producers in the Lagunera region (see the example of OM/JC in previous section), the 
pair MB/GW is a large and experienced producer which has re-oriented its capabilities 
to serve customers that value fashion and superior quality over price. However, 
MB/GW recognizes that its relation with Aztex, as well as with other customers like 
JCPenny’s and Mass Industries (the Limited and Express) have contributed to the 
upgrading of production capabilities and working conditions, the reduction of delivery 
times, wastes, rework and inventory, and the simplification of the company’s structure 
which is now more flexible and agile. Since MB/GW is able to provide a broad range of 
services that goes from assembly to full-package production, its relation with Aztex has 
limited benefits; but for those firms that can only execute particular activities (textile 
production, laundry or finishing) the partnership with the trader could be more 
beneficial because Aztex virtually creates full-package production when acting as 
system integrator or mini-maestro. According to the general director of FFF, to this lace 
manufacturer it is very important to maintain relations with firms that offer full-package 
production services because they absorb most of FFF’s production and connect the 
company with international brand owners such as Victoria’s Secrets, Avon and Fuller. 
FFF decided not to become a full-package producer because this decision would imply 
to compete with its current major customers and expand their traditional productive 
capabilities, instead FFF decided to remain as a specialized manufacturer but made 
additional investment to develop new trendy designs (patterns, colors and textures) that 
increase its attractiveness as supplier to full-package producers. Then particular textile 
producers are particularly benefit from their relations with Aztex, the trader maintains a 
textile directory (denominated “teleteca”) with the support of the Mexican Ministry of 
Economy with the objective to promote domestic textile production and to keep an 
actualized record of all new textiles and materials that are being developed by Mexican 
producers. At its main office in Mexico City, Aztex maintains samples and a limited 
inventory of those textiles fabricated by qualified producers linked to its network. Table 
3 summarizes the activities performed by Aztex on behalf of it customers and to support 
the suppliers.  
 
Table 3. Traders in the textile and garment sector: Aztex’s services and activities 
to support suppliers’ development 
Case Portfolio of services Supporting activities to suppliers 
Aztex Marketing  
Continuous (informal and mainly qualitative) 
marketing research to identify fashion trends 
and customer’s reactions to new products 
Design 
Active participation in the design of products 
Maintenance of a “teleteca” (fabrics directory) 
and investigation about new fabrics 
Identification of specialized firms that could do 
the finishing to fabrics   
Preparation of samples and a complete catalog 
of potential designs for the customer to chose 
Production planning 
Simultaneous production planning for several 
seasons according to qualitative forecasts  
In advance acquisition of fabrics 
Reservation of assembly “space” according to 
demand forecasts 
Selection of suppliers and assignment of 
production loads 
Production 
Supervision of production 
Quality control, definition of “soft” 
Continuous information provided to 
producers of fabrics and garments so they 
can anticipate demand requirements 
according to fashion trends 
 
Marketing tests for new fabrics 
 
Assistance during the transference of design 
to production: finishing of textiles and 
appropriate fit of garments 
 
Acquisition of raw and complementary 
materials such as garnish, accessories and 
trimmings (e.g. marketer logo)  
 
Recommendation of new technologies and 
production techniques to keep pace with 
new styles for fabrics and garments  
 
Feedback to producers of fabrics and 
garments about the acceptability and 
movement of goods (e.g. “mystery 
shopper”) 
specifications and required “fitness” of the 
product 
Order management 
Verification of final order completeness, quality 
and composition 
Order assembly by consolidation of the 
production of multiple suppliers 
Order delivery to customer 
Preparation of all documents required for 
exportation when necessary  
Additional logistics activities 
Selection and management of transportation 
Routing and scheduling 
Return of unsold products upon customer’s 
request 
 
Continuous mentoring to suppliers 
 
Payments to suppliers once the orders are 
picked even when Aztex has not yet 
received the customer’s payments 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the map of Aztex’s logistics supply chain along with those critical 
activities requiring improvement or revision to make Aztex a competent mini-maestro. 
 
Figure 6. Aztex Trading in the textile and garment sector 
Supply chain process flow and identification of challenging activities 
 
Supply Chain Activities Challenges / Critical points 
1) Design a) Continuous marketing research using more objective and 
systematic techniques (at present this function mainly relies on 
top management experience) 
b) Additional time reduction of the design and transference 
phases to attain more flexibility. These two phases are the 
longest. 
2) Sourcing of raw materials a) Efficient collection of fabrics and garnish produced at 
different locations to pass them to assemblers 
b) Development of additional directories (textile directory is 
already implemented) of producers of different garment’s 
accessories 
c) Identification and development of finishers and launders  
4) Order assembly a) Efficient collection of clothing pieces produced at different 
locations for laundering and finishing 
b) Efficient collection of finished garments to assembly final 
order
5) Order delivery a) Development of efficient logistics decisions (e.g. routing 
and scheduling)  
b) Cost reduction for transportation of small volumes within a 
medium size region 
6) Marketing a) Acquisition of new international customers looking for 
flexibility and a high value services 
b) Diversification to other products; at present denim is the 
main product line 
 
 
Despite the popularity of Asia for apparel sourcing, Mexico’s specific advantages 
(location and commercial policies) have the potential to attract new international buyers 
without production facilities or a developed sourcing network -Inditex and Hugo Boss 
have recently asked for Aztex’s services and OMJC managers mentioned Liz Clairborne 
is exploring the possibility to bring back production to the Lagunera region-, these 
international buyers could benefit from the services of trading firms able to offer 
reliable coordination and knowledge services. According to the case studies (Aztex and 
OMJC), apparel sourcing networks in Mexico will resurge as customer-oriented, 
flexible and prime quality networks capable of textile design and logistics as additional 
value-added activities.  Mini-maestros could play a relevant role in the development and 
expansion of such networks.  
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
The supply chain is an effective means for suppliers’ learning and upgrading, but 
this depends on the compromise and attitude of the lead firms in the chain. When lead 
firms pursue international outsourcing, the segment of the supply chain corresponding 
to the full-package sourcing of a product line is coordinated by several agents in 
Mexico: larger firms or associations in regional clusters, local and international OEMs 
or well established manufacturers and traders. The current coordination models, 
specifically the first three, exhibit problems of over-dependence and control of the lead 
firms, restricted participation of subsidiaries or domestic producers in the supply 
network and in other activities besides production. 
 
Regional industrialization and economic development depend on the links of domestic 
firms with other firms, in particular those in the international market. Backward 
linkages, i.e. relationships among producers in a cluster, are insufficient for 
international competitiveness, then coordination from inside the cluster (Model 1) is 
ineffective because participants do not have the financial, expertise and knowledge 
resources required to establish forward linkages and to support the upgrading of the 
sourcing network. SC coordinators emerging from a regional cluster also face the 
problem of leadership recognition and credibility. 
 
A successful SC coordinator should integrate knowledge about the supply and demand 
side, be able to assure the financial sustainability of the sourcing network, help suppliers 
to attain product quality and security standards, guarantee on-time delivery and 
reliability to the customer, and promote the participation and development of domestic 
suppliers. But when these coordinators are OEMs without local links, for example 
traditional and even new generations of maquiladoras, only suppliers in the vertical 
network improve their human, technical and administration capabilities. Despite the 
technical and production improvement attained by participant suppliers, they do not 
participate in other high-value added activities such as marketing and design; the SC 
coordinator appropriates most of the value of the sourcing network. The third model for 
SC coordination identified in the Mexican context -Mexican-USA joint ventures located 
in the Lagunera region- is an efficient coordination alternative but results again in a 
vertical network where only proprietary plants and a few key suppliers have access to 
benefits. 
 
The last type of SC coordination model we identified corresponds to the cases of 
consolidators and Aztex Trading. These third parties support suppliers indirectly by 
monitoring and assisting them during design and production so they can fulfill 
customer’s expectations. They also advice suppliers about new raw materials, 
technologies and production processes; thanks to their intervention, domestic producers 
can innovate in design and offer products that are aligned with market preferences and 
trends. Instead of constructing new facilities, these SC coordinators take advantage of 
the prevailing production capabilities of a region to define product designs and structure 
the sourcing network. They try to develop the production potential of micro to medium 
sized producers or take advantage of the expertise of larger suppliers to fabricate 
customized products, connecting and synchronizing multiple specialized suppliers to 
provide “full package” production. The participation of these agents allows producers to 
concentrate and specialize in manufacturing while the SC coordinator supervises and 
consolidates the production to fulfill large orders and takes charge of the logistics 
activities required to deliver them.   
 
Suppliers participating in sourcing networks coordinated by third parties, either a 
consolidator or a trader, usually work independently; these SC coordinators do not 
absorb the complete production, except in some particular cases, for example when 
artisans fabricate original designs provided by the coordinator (case of consolidator 
AAA).  However, the SC coordinators promote in some way the production capabilities 
of the suppliers in their network. In the case of consolidators, they recommend specific 
suppliers to new customers, meanwhile Aztex maintains a textile directory (Teleteca) 
and selects suppliers according to their abilities to fulfill a specific order (Aztex’s 
customers are not interested in direct relations with suppliers).  
 
The services portfolio of the consolidators and trader includes their participation in the 
design, production, logistics and marketing activities of the sourcing network. The 
abilities and portfolio of services of these coordinators are not as advanced as Li and 
Fung, the mini-maestro benchmark. In particular, the identified Mexican system 
coordinators have not developed outstanding logistics capabilities, logistics is visualized 
as a supporting and secondary function. Consolidators and Aztex Trading rely on third 
parties, especially conventional carriers, to deliver orders to final customers and move 
work in progress across multiple production locations, assuming complete responsibility 
of all transportation management activities, namely identification of carriers, selection, 
contract negotiation, supervision, and direct payment to carriers. 
  
Consolidators and Aztex Trading have oriented their services to a customer segment 
that look for reliable and high value added services over low cost. In consequence, they 
have increased their participation in the design phase, carry out some marketing 
intelligence activities like the identification of new raw materials and finishing 
techniques, and transfer information about best production and commercialization 
practices among the suppliers. All these activities contribute to provide customers with 
original and high quality products, releasing them from the responsibility of the 
establishment of relations with foreign suppliers, the supervision of production and the 
execution of logistics activities, therefore customers can concentrate on their core 
activities (marketing, brand promotion, etc.). Since new lead firms in global supply 
chains (marketers, retailers, and brand manufacturers) may have insufficient 
information about the production capabilities of potential partners, neutral agents with 
profound knowledge about the production characteristics of a sector, and a proper social 
orientation that contributes to trust development and knowledge transference can serve 
as links between buyers and multiple domestic suppliers. The participation of SC 
coordinators in additional high value activities like marketing and design enhances the 
importance of their position in the sourcing network.   
 
According to experiences on other sites of the world - the biotechnology region 
Munich/Martinsried (Lechner and Dowling, 1999) - several groups contribute to the 
regional network structure, the first one is the knowledge broker and coordinator of the 
sourcing activities. Then there are the firms comprising the network, on the supply side 
the SME start-ups and on the demand side the large corporations (TNCs) doing 
activities in the region. The fourth and fifth groups are supporting organizations, like 
academic institutions providing knowledge, research and human resources and financial 
agencies providing venture capital and economic resources. Bitran et al. (2007) propose 
that entities, called mini-maestros, could perform for a subset of the supply chain, all the 
required functions (coordination, knowledge transference, financial support and 
networking) by synchronizing the activities and efforts of all the participants in their 
subnetwork and sustaining proper network governance. Works in other areas of the 
world support the emergence of the mini-maestro concept. In East Asia, Li & Fung IDS 
group has been identified as a company fulfilling the basic characteristics related to the 
concept: management of knowledge, vocabulary, procedures, rules and technologies 
through which an economic activity is conducted, plus networking and logistics 
capabilities (Kooi, 2006). In Germany, the Bio-MAG (Lechner and Dowling, 1999), a 
public company related to a biotechnology cluster has goals compatible with the mini-
maestro role: promotion of partnering and cooperation of firms, technology licensing, 
consulting services, marketing, brokerage of investors, networking with political 
institutions, and trade fair participation. According to our research, Aztex Trading is in 
Mexico one of the closest entities to the mini-maestro concept.  
 
We focused our analysis of the Mexican coordination models on the profile of the SC 
coordinators, their contribution to supplier upgrading and the integration of domestic 
suppliers to global supply chains; additional research is required to precise the impact of 
each form of coordination on the exporting activity and socioeconomic development of 
a region. Another interesting research issue is to analyze the role of public policies in 
supply chain restructuring and governance. Some governmental initiatives supported by 
important OEMs located in Mexico have been launched with the objective to promote 
the integration of national suppliers to automotive chains, among them the Sonora 
Model -the state of Sonora is located in the Northwest of Mexico- and the State of 
Mexico Automotive Cluster. These initiatives promote endogenous over exogenous 
growth and recognize regional suppliers have limited capabilities, capacity and financial 
stability, deficiencies that could be overcome only with the assistance of lead firms in 
global chains. Participant OEMs evaluate potential regional suppliers and provide them 
with the required technical assistance to become competitive in terms of quality, cost 
and on-time delivery, while state governments provide partial funding to participant 
suppliers and encourage inter-firm collaboration. The impact of such initiatives on the 
establishment of cooperative partnerships between OEMs and local suppliers, the 
upgrading of lower tier suppliers (third and fourth), the participation of local producers 
on traditionally vertically integrated supply chains and the resulting forms of 
coordination for the supply chain are important topics to investigate.  
 
Results of this study also suggest the need for the emergence of new service and 
knowledge firms that could help other organizations to deal with problems of global 
sourcing and supply chain coordination, allowing international customers and regional 
producers to focus on their core competencies. These firms will provide basic 
information about the production capabilities of a region, advice about how to deal with 
local regulations and cultural issues, and a full package of services covering production 
and logistics. Neutral third parties operating as logistics providers or traders seem to 
have the essential capabilities and knowledge required to execute the mini-maestro role, 
but they need to promote themselves by partnering with critical international customers 
and develop additional coordination capabilities (e.g. traders require to attain logistics 
operational excellence and logistics providers to network with regional producers). The 
emergence of such SC coordinators could be beneficial not only to companies interested 
in global sourcing and to producers with limited capacity or specialized in a particular 
manufacturing activity, these coordinators could also contribute to the creation, 
sustainability and expansion of sourcing networks with the consequent socioeconomic 
development.  
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